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ABSTRACT. Philosophers have proposed accounts of forgiveness in which the 
victim is warranted in forgiving only if the wrongdoer makes amends for the 
wrong done. According to such an account, forgiveness is made rational by 
the wrongdoer apologizing. But this account creates a puzzle because it seems 
to render cases of undeserved elective forgiveness (where there is no apology 
or repentance) unjustified. My aim in the present contribution is to argue that 
electively forgiving unrepentant wrongdoers can be justified if we accept as 
genuine a minimalist form of forgiveness, according to which a victim can 
forgive and still resent. Further, I suggest that undeserved elective forgiveness 
can be admirable if we extend our conception of reasons to include non-
desert-type reasons, such as reasons of altruism, generosity or reasons of social 
context. 
KEYWORDS. Elective forgiveness, apology, resentment, reasons
I.  INTRODUCTION: TRANSACTIONAL, ELECTIVE AND MINIMALIST 
FORGIVENESS
Forgiveness is typically portrayed as a ‘transaction’ between the vic-tim  and the wrongdoer. This ‘transactional’ model of forgiveness 
( Nussbaum 2016) involves two elements. First, forgiveness must always 
be earned by the wrongdoer, typically through apology or remorse ( Murphy 
1988; Griswold 2007; Kolnai 1973; Swinburne 1989). Second, an apology 
undermines the justification for continued resentment, so blaming nega-
tive feelings towards the wrongdoer should be totally overcome in for-
giveness. According to this traditional understanding then, it is impossible 
to forgive and still resent. 
There are two problems with this conception of forgiveness. The 
transactional model cannot justify undeserved forms of elective forgiveness1, 
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where forgiveness is offered to an unapologetic wrongdoer. If forgiveness 
can be earned and justified only if the wrongdoer apologizes for the 
wrong done, then the transactional model creates a puzzle because it 
seems to make cases of undeserved forgiveness unreasoned and unjusti-
fied.
Secondly, assuming that forgiveness always overcomes retributive 
reactive attitudes towards a wrongdoer is a mistake, as it does not take 
into account cases of grave wrongs2, where the victim claims she has 
forgiven, even if she cannot psychologically or morally overcome all her 
negative feelings.
Nevertheless, we can solve these two problems if we extend our 
conception of forgiveness to include cases in which forgiveness is 
bestowed on a wrongdoer who does nothing to merit it, and cases where 
a victim can forgive even if she is not able to overcome all her negative 
feelings towards a wrongdoer. This account, of course, presupposes a 
certain pluralism about forgiveness.3 If we consider the attitudes and 
emotions overcome in forgiveness, we will have reconciliatory forgiveness, 
whereby a victim forswears resentment (by eliminating it) and reconciles 
with the wrongdoer, and minimalist forgiveness, whereby negative feelings 
are privately maintained even after one has forgiven. On the other hand, 
if we take into account the reasons that can earn and justify forgiveness 
(in the sense of providing permissive reasons), we will have two further 
varieties: earned forgiveness through apology (or remorse), and undeserved elec-
tive forgiveness, which is not justified by desert-type reasons, but instead by 
different sorts of ethical considerations.
My purpose here is to argue that minimalist forgiveness can both 
explain and justify undeserved elective forgiveness. By undeserved elective forgive-
ness I mean two things. The victim is not required to forgive her wrong-
doer – forgiveness is not something that can be owed, but it is freely 
given. In this sense, I believe that all cases of forgiveness are elective. 
Secondly, this type of forgiveness is not conditional on the wrongdoer’s 
apology, but it depends on different types of reasons not related to what 
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the wrongdoer deserves. However, even when forgiveness is freely given, 
it is still the type of thing we do for reasons; it is a norm-governed prac-
tice. We need reasons for forgiveness since we need to (i) be able to 
distinguish forgiveness from other similar responses to offences, such as 
forgetting about the wrong done, excusing the wrong or morally condon-
ing it; (ii) to say why it is permissible to forgive, especially in cases where 
the wrongdoer has not apologized to the victim; (iii) reasons for forgive-
ness can also tell us the difference between merely permissible cases of 
forgiveness and praiseworthy ones.
Undeserved elective forgiveness is often criticized for two reasons. 
First, philosophers have argued that, unless the wrongdoer apologizes, we 
are wrong to forgive since this would mean that we fail to take morality 
seriously, by failing to condemn wrongdoing. Secondly, forgiving unapol-
ogetic wrongdoers amounts to a lack of self-respect on the part of the 
victim.4 Recently, Alexandra Couto (2016) raises another criticism worthy 
of serious consideration. She reformulates the self-respect concern in an 
interesting and persuasive way, by arguing that overcoming resentment in 
the absence of an apology renders forgiveness unjustified since it fails to 
satisfy the resentment’s demand for the affirmation of respect for the 
victim. Resentment implicitly demands respect for the victim. Thus, elim-
inating it in the absence of an apology (which would perform the role of 
answering the demand for respect, by affirming the victim’s violated rec-
ognition respect), is unjustified for this is a basic demand. Couto con-
cludes that undeserved elective forgiveness is thereby unjustified.
I will argue that elective forgiveness can nevertheless be justified. 
First, I draw a distinction between being justified and being earned.5 I will show 
that there are reasons that can justify forgiveness, without actually earning 
it, since only a proper apology can perform this role. Second, I propose 
a minimalist account of forgiveness whereby one can forgive by restoring 
a generic moral relationship with the wrongdoer (and perhaps by relin-
quishing feelings of hatred and revenge), but without eliminating all 
resentful feelings. If this is possible – if we agree that one can forgive and 
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still resent – then the victim does not relinquish her right to demand an 
apology from the wrongdoer, since she decides to continue with her 
resentment. Elective forgiveness can thus be justified, but it will not 
become earned until the wrongdoer apologizes, that is, until she com-
pletely restores a certain balance of moral respect. My conclusion will be 
that one can electively forgive undeserving wrongdoers in a minimalist 
way, and thereby one’s forgiveness will remain justified because one con-
tinues to demand that the wrongdoer affirm the violated norms of respect. 
So, what kinds of reasons do we need for forgiveness? My proposal 
is that forgiveness paradigmatically presupposes judging that the wrong-
doer is culpable for what she has done, with no excuses or justifications 
for her actions, which could negate or fully eliminate her culpability.6 Sec-
ondly, in cases of undeserved elective forgiveness, the fact that the victim 
continues to blame and thus demand an apology from the wrongdoer is 
what renders underserved forgiveness permissible. Finally, there are non-
desert type reasons for forgiving undeserving wrongdoers, which can 
make this kind of forgiveness nor only permissible, but also praiseworthy.
In the next section I will offer some independent reasons as to why 
we should defend minimalist forgiveness. I argue that minimalist for-
giveness is a genuine form of forgiveness. It can justifiably be granted 
in two situations: in cases of undeserved elective forgiveness, when an 
apology is not forthcoming and in cases of grave wrongs, when the 
wrong is too serious and the victim cannot psychologically overcome all 
her hurt feelings. 
II. MINIMALIST FORGIVENESS
It is common to define forgiveness in terms of ‘wiping the slate clean’, 
as a result of undertaking a ‘change of heart’ toward the wrongdoer (Cal-
houn 1992). This ‘change of heart’ is understood in terms of overcoming 
all blaming attitudes towards the wrongdoer7, such as indignation, anger, 
revenge, resentment and hurt feelings. I propose that we move beyond 
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the traditional ‘resentment-based vision of forgiveness’ (Digeser 1998), 
and make room for a minimalist form of forgiveness, in which the victim 
does not overcome all negative feelings towards the wrongdoer. The vic-
tim might persist with her justified condemnatory attitudes and, instead 
of repairing relations and reconciling with the offender, might choose to 
offer a minimalist form of forgiveness. I understand minimalist forgive-
ness in terms of deciding not to let blame feelings influence the way one 
behaves towards the wrongdoer (or talks about the wrongdoer with oth-
ers) in future interactions.8 This minimalist form includes two elements. 
First, a civil relationship is re-established between victim and wrongdoer. 
So although we are not willing to reaccept the offender back into our lives 
as friends or lovers, for example, we do continue to see the offender as 
someone who deserves recognition respect.9 Second, minimal forgiveness 
involves trusting that the other person can change their behaviour; in 
forgiving, we give the offender a chance not to do that same thing again, 
not to repeat the wrongful act. So it places certain expectations on both 
the wrongdoer and the victim. The victim is expressing a commitment 
not to hold the wrongdoer in contempt, not to act in a blaming manner 
(although, of course, private feelings of blame and resentment are still 
justified), and the wrongdoer is expected to eventually provide evidence 
that she has changed by repenting.10 A question may be raised over the 
importance of re-establishing a minimal civil relationship with the wrong-
doer by offering the kind of recognition respect that is already owed to 
all human beings. What is then the point of bestowing minimalist forgive-
ness upon the offender and what does it achieve? I believe this kind of 
forgiveness is especially important in situations where the victim is some-
how stuck with the wrongdoer, perhaps because they are family members, 
or work colleagues, and so she has good reasons to maintain a civil rela-
tionship with the wrongdoer. The victim might find the relationship use-
ful and hope that further cooperation with her colleague in a non- 
confrontational manner might be beneficial and may even bring the 
wrongdoer to eventually admit her fault, while retaining a private feeling 
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of  resentment until the offender makes amends. Forgiving while main-
taining private resentment is more than just giving the recognition respect 
owed to all people, since it allows both parties to move forward in their 
relationship in a civil manner, instead of all their interactions being con-
ditioned by the wrong. 
Brandon Warmke (2016) puts it very nicely when he says that after 
forgiveness has been granted, certain blaming interactions between the 
victim and the wrongdoer become impermissible – interactions (or modes 
of treating the wrongdoer) which were made permissible by the wrongful 
behaviour of the offender (689). For example, the victim is not anymore 
entitled to blame or to hold a grudge against the wrongdoer. What is 
made impermissible as a result of granting forgiveness will vary with the 
context, and it is thus not something fixed. Factors such as the relation-
ship between the wrongdoer and the victim, the seriousness and the sig-
nificance of the wrong, whether the wrongdoer has apologized, will deter-
mine how one should treat an offender after she has forgiven. In the 
account of minimalist elective forgiveness I defend, it is still permissible 
to blame the wrongdoer and to demand an apology from her, precisely 
because the wrongdoer has not yet apologized. Nevertheless, other modes 
of interaction will become impermissible and the victim, in forgiving, 
renounces her right to engage in certain types of overt blaming behav-
iours (seeking revenge and retribution). Paul Twambley (1976) claims 
that, when you are wronged, “You are within your right to resent his 
action. In forgiving him, you relinquish that right, you readjust your rela-
tionship to one of equality” (see Warmke 2016, 689). In offering minimal-
ist forgiveness, however, one may never justifiably relinquish one’s right to 
resent. But one does relinquish other blame-related feelings and one’s 
right to act on these feelings. 
So the question I aim to address is the following: can one forgive and 
still resent? Is it conceivable to imagine someone granting forgiveness 
without attempting to surrender her resentment entirely? Digeser (1998) 
draws our attention to the literary example of The Vicar of Bullhampton 
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(1870), in which the miller Jacob Brattle decides to forgive his daughter 
for becoming a prostitute. He says:
“I will bring myself to forgive her. That it won’t stick here,” and the 
miller struck his heart violently with his open palm, “I won’t be such 
a liar as to say. For there ain’t no good in a lie. But there shall be never 
a word about it more out o’my mouth, – and she may come to me 
again as a child” (see Digeser 1998, 704). 
What I find interesting in this literary example is the fact that for the 
miller forgiveness involves a certain decision, the success of which 
depends on him not mentioning the wrongdoing to his daughter, and not 
on the purity of his heart. Indeed, if he were to bring the wrong up again 
in future conversations it will mean that he has not forgiven after all. So 
he takes forgiveness to be compatible with having certain negative feel-
ings towards the daughter, but incompatible with expressing them or 
acting on them. 
Another form of forgiveness defended in the literature, which like-
wise does not seem to “[…] rest on an uncertain interrogation of the 
heart” (Digeser 1998, 704) is performative forgiveness. Someone might 
say, for example, “I’m am still angry with you, but I forgive you anyway” 
(Norlock 2009, 97). In uttering “I forgive you”, the victim may do more 
than simply report how she feels; she may also intend to change the rela-
tionship between her and the wrongdoer, by waiving her right to seek 
retribution. Kathryn Norlock (2009) puts it very well when she argues 
that the utterance “I forgive you”, sometimes does more than merely 
“reporting, truly or falsely, how one feels […it] may also perform an act 
that sets something new in motion, and changes the relation between 
wrongdoer and victim” (2009, 96).
Forgiveness therefore does not count as ‘genuine’ only when one has 
overcome negative emotions and then reports this fact to the wrongdoer, 
but it can also be ‘real’ in its performative dimension.11 I believe illocu-
tionary forgiveness constitutes a minimalist form of forgiveness12, where 
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the victim chooses to bestow forgiveness on the offender while she may 
still maintain some negative feelings towards her. In this way, the victim 
restores a minimal moral relationship between her and the wrongdoer by 
making a commitment to treat the offender in ways that are compatible 
with an attitude of minimal good will and trust. If, for example, you see 
the wrongdoer as totally rotten and incapable of redemption, then these 
attitudes will rule out any type of forgiveness.
Many recent writers have argued that the ‘transactional’ form of 
forgiveness is the basic or paradigmatic case (see, for example, Fricker), 
and that other types of forgiveness may be understood or explained in 
terms of this canonical form. It might be the case that in our everyday 
practices, and especially in close relationships, we might expect this kind 
of forgiveness: one in which the wrongdoer sincerely apologizes to us, 
promises never to repeat the moral offense, repents, and in which we 
are able to offer our forgiveness in return by totally ‘wiping the slate 
clean’ and reconciling with the wrongdoer. No further anger, resent-
ment, disappointment or blame are appropriate on our part, and we can 
know for sure we have managed to overcome all retributive feelings 
before making an offer of forgiveness. Anything short of this will be a 
disappointment for both parties. Although I am not going to argue 
against this picture here, one thing I would like to avoid is the exces-
sively common assumption in the literature that one form of forgive-
ness always has to be the genuine type or the best kind of forgiveness. 
In this sense, Walker says:
Philosophers know that different people have different ideas about 
what to call ‘forgiveness’. Yet there is a tendency in philosophers’ 
accounts to speak of ‘true’, ‘real’, or ‘genuine’ forgiveness, or about the 
‘essential’, ‘central’, or ‘necessary’ elements of it. This can imply either 
that there is one real process that alone deserves that name, or that if 
there is more than one kind of forgiveness, one of them is the ‘best’ 
or ‘truest’ case of it. I have come to find it odd to think of there being 
a single correct idea of forgiveness, in the way that there is a correct 
theory of the structure of the DNA (2006, 152). 
— 265 —
Ethical Perspectives 25 (2018) 2
CRISTINA ROADEVIN – FORGIVING WHILE RESENTING
I start by describing this exemplar form of transactional forgiveness 
in order to see how other cases of forgiveness approximate to this model 
and in what aspects they are different. I argue that the ‘non-paradigmatic’ 
forms are genuine cases of forgiveness, are equally reason-based practices, and 
involve some change in how the victim behaves towards or sees the wrongdoer as a 
person, so they all share an affective and attitudinal component.
I take as my starting point the definition of forgiveness encountered 
in the work of Murphy (1988). He claims that forgiveness involves for-
swearing resentment for good moral reasons. However, he also argues 
that understanding forgiveness as the overcoming of resentment involves 
a certain puzzle. It is not always the case that overcoming resentment is 
something good. So for Murphy, forgiveness is puzzling because it 
involves forswearing resentment even when overcoming resentment is 
not always desirable. Drawing on the work of Butler, Murphy argues that 
resentment is a noble emotion, which defends us against injustice and 
injuries, and it “[…] expresses respect for the demands of morality (par-
ticularly […] for the demands of self-respect)” (1988, 22). Why is it good 
then to overcome such a useful and “even therapeutic emotion”? (Hamp-
ton 1988a, 35). Trudy Govier asks the same question: “If resentment 
helps us to defy insult and defend our self-respect, would that not show 
that resentment is constructive and good?” (2002, 53) So why would 
overcoming resentment be desirable?
Murphy’s solution to the puzzle is that overcoming resentment is not 
always desirable as this could harm the victim. We should thus continue 
to resent our wrongdoers on occasion. Nevertheless, his conclusion is 
that maintaining resentment means that we have not forgiven. My solu-
tion is to say that forgiveness counts even if we still have justified negative 
feelings towards the offender; it is not always desirable to overcome 
resentment, despite the fact that we have granted forgiveness. Forgive-
ness is not puzzling in the way Murphy suggests because it does not 
always involve forswearing our justified resentment. How is it possible 
then to forgive and still harbour resentment?
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In what follows I will draw on some considerations from Joseph 
Butler’s seminal work on resentment and forgiveness. Butler defends two 
claims regarding resentment and forgiveness: (i) resentment is not in itself 
a vindictive response; and (ii) forgiveness does not forswear all resent-
ment, but only its abuse and excess in the vices of ‘malice’ and ‘revenge’. 
I am particularly interested in his claim that it is desirable to maintain a 
certain kind of ‘virtuous’ resentment13 even after we have forgiven. 
Resentment’s function, according to Butler, is to fight injustice, to demand 
punishment, and to “protect us against future injury”. It “[…] is a weapon 
put into our hands by nature, against injury, injustice and cruelty” (2006, 
viii; 93). Nevertheless, Butler warns us that resentment can be abused 
when we are personally wronged, since it is easy to imagine the injury 
done to us as much worse than it actually was. When this happens, we 
may experience an “[…] extravagant and monstrous kind of resentment”, 
since we are not always capable of impartially thinking about the wrong 
done to us, and we tend to make too much of it (2006, 93).
This is where forgiveness finds its place. Forgiveness corrects for the 
‘excess and abuse’ of the natural feeling of resentment. We should forgive 
so that we can bring down the excess of our resentment to the level 
where the resentment we feel is again proportional to the injury done to 
us. So forgiveness is compatible with continued resentment, since pro-
portional resentment is compatible with an attitude of benevolence 
towards the wrongdoer, and thus, with forgiveness: “We may therefore 
love our enemy, and yet have resentment against him for his injurious 
behaviour towards us” (Butler 2006, 99).
Why then is it good to retain some form of resentment, even after 
we have forgiven? Resentment, according to Butler, defends three differ-
ent values: self-respect, self-defence and the moral order. By resenting:
(i)  We condemn the wrongful actions (so we maintain our self-
respect).
(ii)  We protect ourselves against future injuries as we tend to be more 
cautious (self-defence).
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(iii)  We seek just punishment out of concern for justice, out of respect 
for the moral order (Garcia 2011).
So maintaining resentment shows a ‘reasonable concern for our own 
safety’; without resentment, we would be completely vulnerable to our 
wrongdoers, especially when we are justified in believing that they may harm 
us again. Butler’s account recognizes how difficult it is to overcome our 
malice and hatred, and this is why forgiveness is a virtue; but he also recog-
nizes that sometimes it is simply not safe for us to overcome our resentment.
Something important to notice in Butler’s account is the fact that 
malice and revenge are never justified attitudes to have towards a wrong-
doer. When we are personally offended, we misperceive what has hap-
pened and we tend to see the other person as totally reduced to this 
particular wrong: “[…] the whole man appears monstrous, without any 
thing right or humane in him” (Butler 2006, 101). But this is not a justi-
fied attitude to have, and we should always treat people with decency, 
respect and generosity. Forgiveness then essentially overcomes unjustified 
feelings of malice and revenge. But these are feelings we should not have 
had in the first place.14
Butler is not alone in arguing that forgiveness overcomes unjustified 
retributive feelings while being compatible with some form of resent-
ment. Bennett (2003) and Hampton (1988) defend a similar view of for-
giveness, and I believe their accounts are Butlerian in many ways. For 
instance, in Hampton’s account, forgiving involves seeing the wrongdoer 
as “still decent, not rotten as a person” (1988a, 83). Hampton argues that 
resentment tends to evolve into moral or malicious hatred; the victim 
starts to regard the offender as bad at the core and totally rotten as a 
person. As a result, forgiveness involves changing morally inappropriate 
emotions and beliefs about the wrongdoer, such as moral or malicious 
hatred.
Bennett (2003) defends a conception of elective personal forgiveness, 
according to which one may forgive an unapologetic wrongdoer by 
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changing her morally inappropriate attitude towards the wrongdoer and 
by continuing with her blame. The negative feelings overcome in per-
sonal forgiveness are feelings that one should not have had in the first 
place.
Both accounts further support Butler’s claim that one can forgive and 
yet maintain some form of retributive feelings. In Bennett’s account, one 
can offer this type of forgiveness by continuing with blame. In Hamp-
ton’s account, while feelings of resentment, moral and malicious hatred 
must be overcome, there is a suggestion that we may retain some form 
of moral indignation, even after we have forgiven: 
Suppose they do transcend this emotion. They will still experience 
indignation about the wrongdoing if they drop their defensive posture 
but sustain their opposition to the action. But I can remain emotionally 
opposed to someone’s action, and still come to be supportive of, even 
reconciled to, her, if I am able to disassociate her from the action and 
reapprove of her” (1988b, 148; italics mine).
Let me summarize what we can say about minimalist forgiveness so 
far. It involves:
(i)  A certain change in view about the wrongdoer as a person. We 
start thinking of her as a decent person, a person worth associat-
ing with. 
(ii)  Forgiveness may also overcome unjustified negative feelings, such as 
revenge or hatred.15 
(iii)  One may continue to blame the wrongdoer for what she did, feel 
moral indignation towards her actions, or feel a virtuous type of 
resentment. 
We should thus allow for a type of forgiveness, which is indeed compat-
ible with condemnatory attitudes, whether they manifest in resentment, 
indignation, or blame. In forgiving in this way, we reestablish the minimal 
civil moral relationship with our offenders. By bestowing on them mini-
malist forgiveness, we reaccept them back into the moral community by 
treating them with the appropriate respect owed to decent fellow human 
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beings. We show that we care about them as persons despite what they 
have done and we give them another opportunity to show that they can 
be capable of moral transformation and redemption.
According to this minimalist proposal we ought to maintain the right 
kind of resentment, a healthy type of resentment, especially when we have 
good evidence to believe that the wrongdoer will wrong us again. How-
ever, when we forgive we do commit to put the wrong behind us in the 
sense of not bringing it up again in future conversations, not disparaging 
the wrongdoer in public, or seeking revenge against her. So in forgiving, 
we relinquish our right to express blaming attitudes toward the wrong-
doer (or to act on them), concerning that particular offence, while we 
might still maintain a ‘virtuous’ type of resentment, which can promote 
our wellbeing.
One may wonder why it is good to have such a minimalist form of 
forgiveness. I believe that minimalist forgiveness makes both psycho-
logical and normative sense. In cases of grave wrongs, it recognizes how 
difficult it can be for victims to overcome all negative feelings; thus, 
instead of denying their claim to forgiveness, we could trust their moral 
testimonies. Furthermore, it recognizes that it is not reasonable to demand 
or expect victims to let go of all their retributive emotions. Norlock 
points out that the “overcoming all negative feelings model” makes per-
fect sense when we forgive very minor wrongs, but it does not always 
make sense when we discuss serious wrongs for “[…] the imagined per-
fection of a state in which one overcomes the last drop of one’s anger 
seems counter to experiences with serious wrong, and perhaps amounts 
to an undesirable goal” (2009, 106). 
Minimalist forgiveness can protect victims from future injustice, as 
Butler suggests. There is very little assurance the wrongdoer will not 
offend again. By maintaining some minimal form of moral condemnation, 
we avoid risk and harm to our wellbeing. In addition, as I will demon-
strate below, it plays an important role in reaffirming violated norms of 
respect. Furthermore, minimalist forgiveness is reasonable to offer and 
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morally praiseworthy. We are seldom sure if a wrongdoer is totally rotten 
to the core or incapable of moral transformation, so we have epistemic 
license to offer forgiveness even in the absence of remorse. Minimalist 
forgiveness encourages us to be generous in our final judgments about 
people’s inner moral states and characters and appreciate the potential 
moral goodness in all of us. Finally, minimalist forgiveness answers the 
criticisms aimed at undeserved elective forgiveness. By continuing with 
our condemnatory attitudes, we continue to defend and affirm our sense 
of self-respect, our wellbeing, and we also avoid moral condonation of 
the offense.
So far I have argued that minimalist forgiveness is possible and some-
times justified. In the next section I will show why the minimalist form 
of forgiveness is warranted in cases of undeserved elective forgiveness. 
Briefly, by continuing to blame or resent wrongdoers, a victim never gives 
up her expectation and her right to demand an apology. Therefore, the 
victim manages to preserve her self-respect, proportionally condemn the 
wrongdoing, and demand that the offender offer her apologies. 
III. ELECTIVE FORGIVENESS AND SELF-RESPECT
I have not yet said how resenting is defending the value of self-respect. 
I will do so by proposing a certain view of wrongdoing, which has already 
been defended by Darwall (2006) and Adam Smith (1982), according to 
which moral wrongs are mainly wrongs to our person. That is to say, 
when someone intentionally wrongs us, they thereby disrespect us as per-
sons.16 In this sense, Adam Smith argues that when I resent someone for 
divulging embarrassing secrets about me, which they were supposed to 
keep in confidence, my resentment is not aimed mainly at the disutility 
or inconveniences of that action – it is not merely about the fact that now 
everyone knows embarrassing things about me – but is aimed rather at 
the insult to my moral standing that her action implies. What most “[…] 
enrages us against the man who injures or insults us is the little account 
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which he seems to make of us […] that absurd self-love, by which he 
seems to imagine, that other people may be sacrificed at any time, to his 
conveniency” (Smith 1982, 96).
My proposal, then, is that resentment is directed towards an action 
of disrespect. So, when someone wrongs another, their action expresses moral dis-
respect, and to that extent the wronged party is left with a deficit of respect. This 
deficit of disrespect must be made good through a corrective affirmation 
of respect for the victim. I believe that the best way to counterbalance 
the deficit of respect is through an apology on the part of the offender. 
Thus, in admitting fault, the wrongdoer affirms that she should not have 
treated the victim in that demeaning way, that the victim deserves to be 
treated better, with the appropriate level of respect. This view of wrong-
doing explains why apologies rationally undermine our resentment, so 
that forgiveness can be forthcoming. When an offender apologizes, she 
expressively makes good the deficit of respect, by retracting her claim of 
disrespect. She is thereby expressing her commitment to treat the victim 
better in the future and not repeat the moral offense. The offender has 
now earned her forgiveness, since the balance of respect was restored so 
that the offender and the victim are on a par again; they are equally mor-
ally worthy.
Things are different, however, with elective forgiveness, where no 
apology is given. There is still a deficit of respect between the victim and 
the wrongdoer, which needs to be made good. Unless the wrongdoer 
apologizes (which I understand as an expression of remorse), she will not 
be able to earn her forgiveness. However, I want to claim that another 
type of forgiveness may be warranted, even if it is not properly earned or 
deserved. So what are the reasons that could justify one’s forgiveness, 
despite the fact that it will not be properly deserved?
Most philosophers who defend redemptive forms of forgiveness 
focus very narrowly on apology and remorse as the only acceptable 
grounds (or they add some extra conditions; see Griswold 2007). On a 
redemptive understanding of forgiveness, the wrongdoer has to prove 
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that she has changed, has to prove herself to be ‘morally reborn’ in order 
for one to be able to reassociate oneself with her and accept her back into 
the relationship. Even if I agree that forgiveness may take this form, I will 
propose here a different picture of forgiveness. When I forgive I do not 
wait and expect the other to show she has changed; instead, I trust that 
she is still a decent person, capable of redemption and moral transforma-
tion, and thus I decide to see her in a better light, perhaps despite the 
evidence to the contrary. And I do this for good moral reasons, perhaps 
because I want to give the wrongdoer another opportunity.
The transactional/redemptive model of forgiveness assumes that, in 
the absence of an apology on the part of the wrongdoer, we would be 
wrong to forgive because we would fail to take morality seriously and we 
would even manifest a lack of self-respect (Swinburne 1989; Kolnai 1973; 
Murphy 1988; Griswold 2007). So how can we justify (in the sense of 
offering permissive reasons for) undeserved elective forgiveness? My 
claim is that elective forgiveness is warranted if the victim continues to 
proportionally resent the wrongdoer (until apologies are offered). Further, 
there are ethical considerations in favour of forgiving unapologetic 
wrongdoers, which render such forgiveness morally praiseworthy.
Now I need to say something about why continuing with our resent-
ment answers the two worries raised against undeserved elective forgive-
ness, and, in particular, why it solves Couto’s17 scepticism about elective 
forgiveness.
Following Adam Smith and Pamela Hieronymi, I understand resent-
ment as a form of protest against the disrespect expressed in someone’s 
action. In resenting a wrongdoer, the victim represents herself as wronged, 
as someone who may not be treated in that manner. So, by resenting, a 
victim implicitly makes a claim of respect – she demands to be treated 
better. It is implicit in resentment that the victim’s rights have been vio-
lated in some way, that certain interpersonal norms of ‘recognition respect’ 
have been violated (Darwall 2006). Even if the disrespectful claim is not 
retracted (the offender continues with her disrespect and thus the balance 
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of respect between victim and offender still has the victim in deficit), the 
victim continues to demand that the offender address the wrong by apol-
ogizing and she therefore also continues to re-assert her respect.
My claim is that resentment expresses respect for the victim so as to 
counterbalance the disrespect expressed in wrongdoing. You wrong me 
and I defend my moral standing by affirming that I do not deserve to be 
treated in that manner. But, of course, the fact that resentment corrects 
in some way for the balance of respect does not defeat the need for an 
apology on the part of the wrongdoer. The job of affirmation of respect 
needs to be done by all parties involved, especially the wrongdoer. If 
someone wrongs me and I resent her, I have made a certain expressive 
correction of the disrespect involved in the wrongdoing. However, this 
has not changed the fact that I still want my wrongdoer to make  correction 
for the wrong done by apologizing to me. Because of this, elective for-
giveness can never be deserved or earned unless the wrongdoer  apologizes 
to the victim.
By accepting that forgiveness can come about in the minimalist form 
I am proposing here, it follows that it can be justified even if it does not 
meet a certain demand for respect implicit in resentment – that of re-
affirming that both parties are equally morally worthy through apology, 
or, as Couto puts it, the re-establishment of reciprocal recognition respect. 
The victim can continue to insist on her demand for the reaffirmation of 
respect by continuing with her resentment until the wrongdoer apolo-
gises. Once an apology is offered, then undeserved elective forgiveness 
becomes earned forgiveness.
Granting elective forgiveness, therefore, does not cancel the demand 
for making appropriate reparations. One of my claims is that undeserved 
elective forgiveness is not an unconditional gift offered to an unrepentant 
wrongdoer18, as it depends (in order for it to count as appropriate) on the 
victim’s continued attitude of resentment (or moral condemnation). Unde-
served elective forgiveness approximates to the transactional model in that 
it involves seeing the wrong as an unexcused, unignored, and unjustified 
— 274 —
 Ethical Perspectives 25 (2018) 2
ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES – JUNE 2018
moral offense. Nevertheless, the victim continues to have some justified retrib-
utive feelings, while renouncing others (such as seeking revenge or dwelling 
on the wrong), which would be incompatible with a forgiving attitude.
In conclusion, if we accept that forgiveness may come in more min-
imalist forms and that sometimes a certain degree of blame feeling (such 
as resentment) can still persist, then elective forgiveness can be defended 
against the two charges mentioned above (the moral condonation and the 
lack of self-respect worry19).
Still, even if we agree that the victim can genuinely offer a minimalist 
type of forgiveness to unapologetic wrongdoers, one might legitimately 
wonder if this type of forgiveness is praiseworthy. Gamlund, for example, 
argues that any supererogatory act (he sees undeserved elective forgive-
ness as a paradigmatic case of an act that is beyond the call of duty) 
should include three elements: “[…] it must be permissible; it must not 
be obligatory; and it must be good or praiseworthy, that is, it must have 
a certain moral value” (2010, 541).
So far, I have demonstrated that it can be permissible. I want now 
to argue that it can be praiseworthy and that the reasons in its favour do 
not have the power to oblige the victim to forgive.
It is worth pointing out at this juncture that my strategy for defending 
undeserved elective forgiveness is different from most accounts of elective 
forgiveness. Other accounts try to vindicate it by either saying that we are 
never obligated to feel resentment towards the wrongdoer, even if we are 
justified in our resentment (Allais 2008; 2013), or by arguing that forgive-
ness can be ‘gracious’, that is, it can be bestowed as an unmerited favour 
on an undeserving wrongdoer (Pettigrove 2012). My strategy is different 
for two reasons. First, we need to say what makes forgiveness permissible, 
if we want to offer a good reply to critics who claim that there is something 
problematic with undeserved forms of forgiveness, since the victim either 
fails to condemn the wrong enough or shows a lack of self-respect. Second, 
specifying the considerations in favour of forgiving can allow us to distin-
guish admirable forms of forgiveness from those that are less admirable.
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IV. REASONS IN FAVOUR OF ELECTIVE FORGIVENESS
I have argued that continuing with one’s resentment is necessary in order 
for the victim to reaffirm her self-respect. Nevertheless, this is not enough 
to explain why minimalist elective forgiveness can be morally praisewor-
thy. Let me now propose a conception of reasons, which can make it 
intelligible and morally good for a victim to forgive her undeserving 
wrongdoer electively. Furthermore, although these reasons can explain 
why forgiveness can be admirable, they do not have the force of a moral 
obligation. 
Overcoming Vindictive Responses 
One of the reasons for forgiving unrepentant wrongdoers might be a 
certain moral view of the world the victim may have. For example, the 
victim may be the type of person who believes that the less anger there 
is in the world, the better the world is. In this care, the victim’s reasons 
are about a certain social good that will be achieved by her avoiding vin-
dictive attitudes, although not entirely, as some form of condemnatory 
attitude towards the wrong may still persist (the form of virtuous resent-
ment I mentioned previously). Such a victim might agree with  Nussbaum’s 
(2016) recent criticisms of the transactional model of forgiveness, which 
always requires the wrongdoer to abase herself by apologizing – although, 
of course, I do not share this view of apology since one can surely apol-
ogize without the desire to see the other person humiliated. She may also 
think, as Nussbaum does, that anger is tied to an unjustified desire to 
cause the wrongdoer to suffer. Nussbaum argues that anger is vindictive, 
since it displays a ‘payback mentality’, which is combined with a focus on 
rank and moral status. Anger is about getting back at the wrongdoer, 
making him suffer in order to elevate oneself above the wrongdoer. It is 
a self-indulgent emotion displaying insecurity, which encourages one to 
see “[…] everything that happens as about oneself and one’s own rank” 
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(Nussbaum 2016, 28). The desire for payback is always unjustified because 
making another person suffer by seeking retribution will not make things 
better and will definitely not undo the harm. We should adopt a more 
forward looking view instead of the ‘inquisitorial and disciplinary’ mental-
ity involved in transactional forms of forgiveness, and focus on future 
welfare.
While I do not share Nussbaum’s view on anger and apologies, 
I can see how this moral view of the world can count in favour of for-
giving wrongdoers. So, on this view, although the victim sees the 
wrongdoing as unjustified and unexcused, and despite the fact that she 
expresses her moral disapproval and protest of his actions, nevertheless, 
she decides to forgive the undeserving wrongdoer because she is con-
fident that focusing on forward-looking issues such as personal and 
social welfare, instead of vindictiveness or retribution, makes for a bet-
ter world to live in. She thus decides to trust the offender and see him 
as a decent human being, despite his wrongdoing; she does it from an 
altruistic motive, because she justifiably believes it would benefit both 
parties, and it would create more noble interpersonal and social rela-
tions. What she does is praiseworthy because a certain social good may 
be achieved by focusing on issues of future welfare, on building trust 
and hope, instead of letting feelings of hate and anger dominate the 
relationship. 
Reasons of Beneficence and Care
A victim might also decide to forgive out of sheer generosity, motivated 
by the desire to help a certain disadvantaged member of the moral com-
munity who is in need of a second chance, even if he has not yet come 
around to share the moral point of view of the victim and thus remains 
a wrongdoer. This is the case for the main character in Victor Hugo’s 
novel Les Misérables, where Jean Valjean is given another opportunity to 
remake his life, despite his wrongdoing – Valjean is convicted of theft 
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and sent to prison. Bishop Myriel decides to forgive the  ex-convict, 
Jean Valjean, when nobody in the moral community is prepared to accept 
him back as a member of equal standing who can be trusted again. Valjean 
is astonished and grateful by such altruistic behaviour. The generosity 
shown in forgiving Valjean inspires and changes his character. Indeed, 
Valjean undergoes a complete moral transformation after the encounter 
with the bishop, which would have been impossible without the bishop’s 
kindness and generosity. Such generosity is important for our moral life, 
and showing generosity might bring the wrongdoer to feel remorse about 
the wrong done and change her ways. 
Why is this a case of genuine forgiveness and why is it morally praise-
worthy? It is a case of forgiveness since, although the bishop is within his 
right to denounce Valjean to the police20, to ignore his wellbeing and to 
be angry with him, he decides to waive this right for good moral reasons. 
He sees him as a decent person worth giving another opportunity. More-
over, he does not make excuses and does not rationalize Valjean’s actions. 
He continues to see them as morally wrong and condemn them. Never-
theless, he decides to forgive him by trusting that he can change and 
repent. What the bishop does is morally praiseworthy, as it is an act of 
kindness motivated by the need to help Valjean, which is definitely 
beyond the call of duty.
But this does not imply that he gets away with the wrongdoing, as 
Valjean is in a sense in the bishop’s debt and still needs to make up for 
his wrongdoing by repenting. One implication of this is that although the 
account of forgiveness I am proposing is elective, it is not totally uncon-
ditional. Even if the bishop electively decides to forgive Valjean by waiv-
ing his right to openly protest wrongful behaviour and act on his resent-
ment, Valjean still has a moral debt towards the bishop, that is, he has to 
make up for what he did by taking steps to repair the moral wrong. In 
this sense, elective forgiveness is different from earned forms of forgive-
ness, where it seems to be the case that after the offender has apologized 
and was granted forgiveness, he is no longer in his victim’s debt. 
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 Nevertheless, the bishop does not base his forgiveness on desert-based 
reasons, rather he is motivated by reasons of beneficence and kindness, 
which makes his forgiveness morally admirable. Furthermore, even if for-
giveness in this case is the best thing the bishop could have done for 
Valjean (since he really needs another opportunity), the bishop is still 
within his right not to forgive.21 Given that he was wronged, forgiveness 
is not something owed to Valjean as a matter of duty.
We should thus distinguish between reasons that provide moral obli-
gations, and permissive reasons, which merely count in favour of per-
forming a certain action. As the literature on moral obligations (Darwall 
2006; Stern 2014) and supererogation (Dreier 200422; Horgan and 
 Timmons 2010) suggests, not all reasons in favour of doing something 
have the power to generate moral obligations. I may have good reasons 
to take out health insurance – so that my family does not go bankrupt 
paying medical bills – but I am not morally obligated to do so. I may be 
criticized for being careless and foolish when I refuse to get insurance, 
but I do not deserve the kind of blame and punishment that would be 
appropriate were I to violate the moral obligation not to kill innocent 
people. Thus, being justified in performing an action is not the same as 
being obliged to do that action.
The Reason-Giving Power of the Community 
So far I have concentrated on interpersonal cases of forgiveness. One 
may wonder, however, whether all this can apply to forgiveness for grave 
wrongs that affect an entire moral community. Thus, how can one forgive 
an unrepentant offender for serious acts of wrongdoing, under oppressive 
conditions? While I do not have the space to discuss this important issue 
at length, I would like to briefly suggest that reasons for forgiveness 
might also come in a collective form. For example, I believe that reasons 
of social context (community-based reasons) played an important role for 
Babalwa Mhlauli, who, in her testimony to the South African Truth and 
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Reconciliation Commission (TRC), expressed her desire to forgive the 
unrepentant killers of her father.23 How can we even make sense of her 
behaviour, and can it be morally admirable?
Pamela Hieronymi argues that in cases of merited forgiveness, the 
apology removes an existing threat to the victim and corrects for the 
wrong done to her, so now she feels safe to forgive. I suggest that in 
certain cases of grave wrongs, the community can also remove this exist-
ing threat to the victim by showing solidarity with her, such that she can 
feel safe and empowered to forgive her wrongdoer. Therefore, the com-
munity’s moral support can serve as an analogue reason to apology, as 
they can achieve similar things: that of removing the threat and repairing 
the wrong. This idea receives some support from Hieronymi when she 
claims “Perhaps unilateral forgiveness (forgiveness of the unrepentant) is 
possible in cases in which the one offended receives strong community 
support” (2001, 552).
So how can we justify and explain Mhlauli’s behaviour? We can 
understand this if we consider the role that the TRC had in vindicating 
the victim of injustice, by affirming her standing and by showing solidar-
ity with her, even if the wrongdoers did not apologize to the victim.24 
The  TRC marked and recognized the terrible atrocities committed as 
wrongs and gross human rights violations. The TRC therefore served as 
a symbolic way of taking the wrongs and their victims seriously. In forgiv-
ing, the victim expresses her acknowledgment that enough has been done 
collectively to show her the proper respect she deserves, and this makes 
it safe for her to forgive. Thus, there is enough recognition of the wrongs 
done to her by the community since even if not the perpetrator, others 
in the community are redeeming the level of respect owed to her. The 
community therefore rationalizes and justifies her forgiveness. This gives 
the victim a justificatory counterpart reason to apology – it is the socially 
disseminated moral solidarity and reaffirmation of the victim’s moral sta-
tus, which allows for forgiveness of the unrepentant to be morally justi-
fied. Of course, I am not claiming here that apologies are no longer due. 
— 280 —
 Ethical Perspectives 25 (2018) 2
ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES – JUNE 2018
The perpetrators ought to show the appropriate respect for the victim 
and forgiveness will not be earned otherwise. Forgiveness is unearned in 
relation to the wrongdoer, but conditional on the community redeeming 
the level of respect and affirming the victim’s standing. The community 
makes it intelligible, rational, and good for the victim to forgive, since 
otherwise she would be stuck in the past without being able to move on 
with her life.25
V. CONCLUSION 
I have argued that the ‘transactional’ model of forgiveness, which 
requires apology or repentance, is too limited to capture all those 
instances of forgiveness in which we forgive for many other ethical 
reasons. Furthermore, the transactional model proposes that victims 
should overcome all blaming reactive emotions in order for that action 
to count as forgiveness. However, this proposal does not always 
acknowledge the experiences of moral agents, especially in cases of 
grave wrongs, where these agents may grant forgiveness without for-
swearing many of the negative reactive attitudes occasioned by the 
wrong they suffered. An account of forgiveness should be fluid enough 
to include those cases in which we grant forgiveness in the absence of 
apology or remorse, and those occasions when we express our forgive-
ness performatively, despite our inability or unwillingness to overcome 
all our resentful blame feelings.
My main aim has been to defend an account of minimalist elective 
forgiveness. I argue that undeserved elective forgiveness, despite the fact 
that it is not earned by the wrongdoer’s apology, is a morally justified and 
praiseworthy phenomenon. This is due to two reasons. First, by continu-
ing with resentment, the victim affirms her moral standing by demanding 
respect for herself. Second, there are non-desert based considerations in 
favour of forgiving unrepentant wrongdoers, which render such forgive-
ness morally praiseworthy.26 
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NOTES
 1. Philosophers who defend elective forgiveness include Allais (2008; 2013); Garrard and 
McNaughton (2003); Pettigrove (2012); North (1987); Govier (2002); Calhoun (1992).
 2. For an excellent discussion of forgiveness for grave wrongs, see Norlock and Rumsey (2009).
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 3. For other pluralist accounts, see Walker (2006), Bennett (2003), and Fricker (MS). 
 4. For a development of these criticisms, see Swinburne (1989); Kolnai (1973); Murphy 
(1988); and Griswold (2007).
 5. I have argued for this distinction in Roadevin (2017). 
 6. Although this assumption is not entirely uncontroversial. Cf. Gamlund (2011), who 
argues that forgiveness is not always aimed at culpable wrongdoing. 
 7. For this view, see Murphy (1988); Allais (2008); Griswold (2007); Holmgren (1993); 
Fricker (MS); Hieronymi (2001). 
 8. Cowley (2010) similarly understands forgiveness as a conscious decision to “[…] prevent 
one’s morally legitimate resentment from influencing one’s thoughts about the offender” (558). 
I agree with him here that forgiveness involves a decision, but one that can be characterized in terms 
of not acting on one’s resentment, although resentment may still influence one’s private thoughts. 
 9. I use ‘recognition respect’ in the way Darwall (2006) and Walker (2006) use it. 
10. Insofar as the victim has not completely given up on the wrongdoer, some form of 
amends are still in order. 
11. For performative accounts of forgiveness, see Pettigrove (2012); Haber (1991); Warmke 
(2016). 
12. By calling it ‘minimalist’ I do not mean to imply that it is a less desirable form of for-
giveness. In certain contexts, this will be the best form of forgiveness one can offer. 
13. Garcia (2011) has recently defended this interpretation of Butler, suggesting we call 
resentment that is not vindictive, ‘virtuous resentment’. For a similar interpretation of Butler, see 
also Scarre (2004).
14. Because of this, Butler takes the view that forgiveness is morally obligatory. We should 
always regard the other person as a decent human being and never as a monster incapable of 
moral transformation. Garcia (2011) also seems to agree with Butler that forgiveness is an uncon-
ditional moral obligation, which we ought to offer even to the worst moral offenders – so nobody 
is truly unforgivable (Section V, 12-16). 
15. Although, of course, feelings of hatred and revenge may sometimes be justified (Murphy 1988). 
16. I defended this view of wrongdoing in Roadevin (2017). 
17. It is worth pointing out that Couto would disagree with my interpretation of forgive-
ness, since she believes that genuine forgiveness overcomes all retributive emotions. 
18. For the ‘gift’ view, see Fricker (MS) and Pettigrove (2012). 
19. Griswold (2007, 45); Murphy (1988, 17-18); Novitz (1998, 299). For a convincing reply 
to the self-respect objection, see Pettigrove (2012, 111-117). The condonation objection is dis-
cussed in detail by Bennett (2003). 
20. It is worth pointing out that it would have been possible for the bishop to forgive 
Valjean as a human being while deciding to denounce him to the police as a criminal who should 
perhaps be punished. In this example, the bishop does both: he forgives and relinquishes his right 
to legally denounce him. 
21. I assume here that despite the fact that Myriel is a bishop and may have certain obliga-
tions to be generous towards people, he is nevertheless entitled to blame wrongdoers, so it is up 
to him whether he forgives or not. 
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22. He claims that reasons of beneficence do not generate moral obligations since they so 
not have a moral requiring strength, so they only count in favour of performing a supererogatory 
action. Reasons stemming from justice, on the other hand, bring about moral requirements. 
23. This example is discussed in Allais (2008). 
24. Walker (2006) and MacLachlan (2008) likewise talk about how important it is for the 
community to offer moral support for the victim of injustice. 
25. Hallich (2013) also proposes that we extend the category of the sorts of reasons that 
can make forgiveness desirable and virtuous. Among these reasons, he discusses prudential rea-
sons related to improving the wellbeing of the forgiver. The case of Mhlauli is such a case, 
whereby her forgiveness is in her best interests, since it helps her overcome the wrongdoing by 
overcoming feelings of hatred, thus it has a cathartic value.
26. I would like to thank Chris Bennett, Adriana Clavel, Miranda Fricker, Glen Pettigrove 
and two anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts.
